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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
RELIANCE NATIONAL LIFE IN-1
SURAN CE COMP ANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
)
.JAMES K CAINE, dba Caine Agency,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.

10940

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover $6,762.73 claimed owing
to the Respondent by the Appellant for moneys advanced
to the Appellant and to his sub-agents, and moneys collected by the Appellant and his sub-agents which should
have been paid to the Respondent but which were not
so paid. To this action by the Plaintiff, the Defendant
filed a counterclaim praying for an accounting to the
Defendant for all sums dm· to tlw Defendant from the
Plaintiff, together with judguwnt for $50,000.00 damages for malicious interf erPnee with the Defendant's
business.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a trial of the case, the Court granted judg.
ment to the Respondent for the sum of $6,762.73, and
dismissed the Appellant's counterclaim, no cause of
action.
RELIEF SOUGHrr ON APPEAL
The Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the
trial court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
'fhe Statement of Facts set out in Appellant's brief
is substantially correct.
Concerning the statements contained in the last
three paragraphs on page 4 and the first paragraph on.
page 5 of Appellant's brief, the following is material:
During the trial of August 1, 1960, counsel for thP
parties agreed that the depositions of Joseph Ashton
Cosby and Richard H. Mortensen would be taken and
submitted to the Court for consideration before entering judgment. This was done. The signature of the
witness to the Cosby deposition was waived in writing
by counsel for both parties, and the signature to the
Mortensen deposition was waived at the time of the
taking of the deposition by counsel for both parties.
When counsel for the Respondent received and ex
amined the record on appeal, it was discovered that tht
testimony of several witnesses, including that of one
Jack Fletcher, was not to be found in the record. After
diligent effort made to find what reporter took tlie
testimony and efforts to locate the same were fruitless,
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the Respondent presented a motion to the Court to have
accepted additional evidence for inclusion in the record
'
based on the affidavit of Jack E~letcher and the affidavit
of J. Grant Iverson, counsel for the Plaintiff, and the
recollection of the Court as to the proceedings in such
matter. After the motion was presented to the Court
and testimony taken and argued by counsel, the Court
certified that said Jack Fletcher, treasurer and keeper
of the financial records of the Plaintiff, was sworn and
testified from the Plaintiff's records in his possession
at the time of the trial, and that said records disclosed
that the Defendant was indebted to the Plaintiff in the
amount of $6,762.73.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSIDERING THE TWO DEPOSITIONS IN THIS CAUSE
BECAUSE OF THE COURT'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 30(f) (1), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, WHICH PERTAINS TO DEPOSITIONS UPON ORAL EXAMINATION.

Appellant, citing Rule 30 (f) (1), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, states that the depositions taken in this
cause did not comply with said rule and, therefore,
should not have been considered by the Court.
An examination of the depositions will disclose that
the officer taking the depositions properly certified to
the matters required by Rule 30(f) (1), except that the
depositions apparently were delivered to Judge Hanson
rather than being put in tlw court files to avv'ait somP
further action.
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Appellant states that according to the Register oi
Actions, both of the depositions, one taken on Augusts,
and one on August 22, 1960, were not received by th"
Court until January 5, 1961 and they were "not sealed"
according to the entry of such Register. In the saml'
argument, Appellant states that in Defendant's State
ment of the Case dated November 23, 1960, he refers tu
the deposition of Mr. Cosby and of Mr. Mortensen, anJ
that counsel for the Respondent in his Statement of th1·
Case also dated Novmeber 23, 1960, refers to .Mr. Cos
by's deposition.
The memorandum decision was signed and filed on
January 5, 1961, the date Appellant states the Court
received the depositions. It is apparent that the depo·
sitions were delivered directly to Judge Hanson an<l
retained by him until he entered his memorandum decision, and the depositions were then filed with the
Clerk with his memorandum decision.
At the hearing of August 1, 1960, as shown at pages
96 and 97 of the record, the following occurred:
Mr. Iverson: "It would be fair to the Court w
make a deposition available. May the ord~r
be that we submit a short deposition on thi5
matter."
Here counsel is refrrring to Mr. Mortensen and hi)
evidence in this case.
To this rey_uest that the order be that we submit 11
short deposition, Mr. Larsen stated:
"That will be fine."
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lf there was SOlll(' irregularity in the taking, transcribing, and submitting of the deposition, the objection
~honld have been taken promptly, and having not been
taken, is waived.
Rule 32(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states:
.. As to Completion and Return of Deposition.
Errors and irregularities in the manner in which
the <lepm;ition is transcribed or the deposition
is prepared, signed, certified, sealed, endorsed.
transmitted, filed or otherwis dealt with lw the
officer under Rules 30 and 31 are waived ~nless
a motion to supress the deposition or some part
thereof is made with reasonable promptness after
its defect is, or with due diligence might have
been, ascertained."
As heretofore stated, the Defendant in his Statement of the Case dated November 23, 1960, refers to
the depositions of Mr. Cosby and Mr. Mortensen. He
at that time should have made any objections that might
he thought proper. The objections now made, nearly
eight years later, are the first objections to the depositions and the manner of their preparation, transmittal
and filing.
To the same effect is the rule on waiver of such
matters found in 23 Arn. J ur. 2d, Sec. 13-±, page 461.

In the memorandum decision filt•d by the Court (R.
25), the Court found:
''1. 'l'hat the Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment
a(}'ainst
the Defendant for the snm of $6,762.73.
I:>
The Court makt's this finding based upon th1·
following:
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"(a) That any prior breach by the Plaintiff
i~ any, would not ?ea bar to the applica:
t10n of the forfeiture provision of tht
agency supervisor contract; and,
"(b) That the evidence indicates clearly that
the forfeiture proyision should be ap.
plied and, particularly in view of tlir·
evidence adduced upon the deposition,
submitted with the statements of tht
parties."
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
JUDGMENT AGAINST CAINE FOR $6,762.73.

Appellant argues under Point Two of his brief that

the trial court erred in granting judgment for $6,762.n
because there were no accounting records, no testimony
as to the conclusion reached, and no evidence of an)
type, kind or description as to how this money judgment
was determined.
This argument is perfectly valid because at the
time Appellant filed his brief, the record was not complete. When Respondent received and checked the record,
to his surprise the evidence given at the trial by the
treasurer of the Respondent was not in the record. Dili·
gent search was made of the record to find the evidence
of Mr. Fletcher, treasurer of the Respondent, but sncl
search did not produce the record.
Respondent then made a motion before the tria
court for an order for transmittal of evidence omittetl
from the record on appeal for inclusion in the recorr:
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of appeal, supported by an affidavit of Jack Fletcher
to the t~ff ect that during the year 1960 he was employed
by Reliance National Lifo Insurance Company as treasure>r and heper of the financial records of said company, and that during the summer of the year 1960 the
affiant was sworn and testified in the case of Reliance
National Life Insurance Company, Plaintiff, vs. James
K Caine, Defrndant, before Judge Stewart M. Hanson,
on behalf of the Plaintiff. That at said time the affiant
had with him the records of the account of the Defendant James E. Caine with the said Reliance National Life
Insurance Company, and from said records testified that
there was O\Ving from the Defendant Jam es E. Caine
to the Plaintiff an amount more than $6,000.00 but less
than $7 ,000.00.
The motion was also supported by an affidavit of
J. Grant In•rson, counsel for the Plaintiff, that during
the year 1960 the affiant acted as counsel in the above
entitled cause at the trial thereof, and at said trial Jack
Fletcher, treasurer of Reliance National Life Insurance
Company, was S\\'Orn and testified before the Honorable
~tPwart M. Hanson, Judge of thi> above Pntitled court,
from records which he had in his possession at the trial,
and which he identified as the financial records of ReliancP National Life Insnranee Company, which contained tlH• account of the Defrndant, J a1m~s K Caine,
with th<· said insurance company, and that at said timt•
~aid ,) ack Fletcher testified that the records disclosed
that the Defendant was indd>ted to the Plaintiff in the
amount of $G,7G2.73.
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A hearing was had upon said motion on January 11,
1968, at which the Court found as follows:
"The Court ... now finds and certifies that dur.
ing the summer of 1960, the exact date being
undetermined at this time, the above entitlerl
cause was heard in part by this Court, and at
said hearing one Jack Fletcher, treasurer aml
keeper of the financial records of Reliance Na
tional Life Insurance Company, was sworn ana
testified from Plaintiff's records in his possession
reflecting the status of the account between Reliance National Life Insurance Company an~
James E. Caine. '1"11at from said records, th1'
said Jack Fletcher testified that the Defendanl
James E. Caine was indebted to the Plaintiff,
Reliance National Life Insurance Company, asoi
the date of said trial in the amount of $6,762.73.''
Counsel for Appellant cites numerous cases in

SU]r

port of the rule of law that when there is no competent
evidence in a law case to warrant the findings of fac1
and decision, the Supreme Court may interfere and hola
the findings and decision void.
With this Respondent does not disagree, nor doe1
the Respondent disagree with the cases cited by tli1
Appellant. However, with the inclusion of the evidenc'
certified by the trial court as aforesaid, there is comp~
tent evidence in the case to support the findings of fat'
and judgment of the trial court in this matter.

9

CONCLUSION
'l'he trial court did not Prr in itR decision.
Respectfully submitted,

MOFJ<'A'l', 1VERSON AND
TAYLOR
By J. Grant lven;on
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent

